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ABSTRACT 
The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a 
software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a 
personal computer running the Microsoft Windows? operating system.  SAPHIRE is primarily funded 
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL).  The INL's primary role in this project is that of software developer and tester.  Using the 
SAPHIRE analysis engine and relational database is a complementary program called GEM.  GEM has 
been designed to simplify using existing PRA analysis for activities such as the NRC’s Accident 
Sequence Precursor program.  In this report, the theoretical framework behind GEM-type calculations are 
discussed in addition to providing guidance and examples for performing evaluations when using the 
GEM software.  As part of this analysis framework, the two types of GEM analysis are outlined, 
specifically initiating event (where an initiator occurs) and condition (where a component is failed for 
some length of time) assessments. 
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vFOREWORD  
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has developed the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on 
Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) software used to perform probabilistic risk assessments 
(PRAs) on a personal computer. SAPHIRE enables users to supply basic event data, create and solve fault 
and event trees, perform uncertainty analyses, and generate reports. In that way, analysts can perform 
PRAs for any complex system, facility, or process. 
SAPHIRE can be used to model a plant's response to initiating events, quantify core damage frequencies, 
and identify important contributors to core damage (Level 1 PRA). The program can also be used to 
evaluate containment failure and release models for severe accident conditions, given that core damage has 
occurred (Level 2 PRA). In so doing, the analyst could build the PRA model assuming that the reactor is 
initially at full power, low power, or shutdown. In addition, SAPHIRE can be used to analyze both internal 
and external events, and it includes special features for transforming models built for internal event analysis 
to models for external event analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify the frequency of 
release consequences (Level 3 PRA). Because this software is a very detailed technical tool, users should 
be familiar with PRA concepts and methods used to perform such analyses. 
SAPHIRE has evolved with advances in computer technology. The versions currently in use (6 and 7) run 
in the Microsoft Windows® environment. A user-friendly interface, Graphical Evaluation Module (GEM), 
streamlines and automates selected SAPHIRE inputs and processes for performing event assessments. 
SAPHIRE has also evolved with users' needs, and Versions 6 and 7 include new features and capabilities 
for developing and using larger, more complex models. For example, Version 7 can solve up to 2 million 
sequences and includes enhancements for cut set slicing, event tree rule linkage, and reporting options. 
This NUREG-series report comprises seven volumes, which address SAPHIRE/GEM Versions 6 and 7. 
Volume 1, "Overview/Summary," gives an overview of the functions available in SAPHIRE and presents 
general instructions for using the software. Volume 2, "Technical Reference," discusses the theoretical 
background behind the SAPHIRE functions. Volume 3, "SAPHIRE Users' Manual," provides installation 
instructions and a step-by-step approach to using the program's features. Volume 4, "SAPHIRE Tutorial 
Manual," provides an example of the overall process of constructing a PRA database. Volume 5, 
"GEM/GEMDATA Reference Manual," discusses the use of GEM. Volume 6, "SAPHIRE Quality 
Assurance (QA) Manual," discusses QA methods and tests. Lastly, Volume 7, "SAPHIRE Data Loading 
Manual," assists the user in entering PRA data into SAPHIRE using the built-in MAR-D ASCII-text file 
data transfer process. 
Christiana H. Lui, Director 
Division of Risk Analysis 
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research 
vi
vii
CONTENTS 
PREVIOUS REPORTS......................................................................................................................... ii
ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................................... iii
FOREWORD .........................................................................................................................................v
CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................................ix
ACRONYMS........................................................................................................................................xi
1. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1
1.1 Background.............................................................................................................................1
1.2 The Need for GEM..................................................................................................................2
2. GENERAL EVENT EVALUATION FRAMEWORK ....................................................................5
2.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................5
2.2 Conditional Probability Calculations ........................................................................................7
2.3 Event Importance Calculations...............................................................................................10
3. THE TWO TYPES OF GEM EVENT EVALUATIONS ..............................................................13
3.1 Initiating Event Assessments..................................................................................................13
3.1.1 Treatment of Initiating Events for Initiating Event Assessments.............................................14
3.1.2 Treatment of Component Recovery for Initiating Event Assessments .....................................15
3.1.3 Treatment of Common Cause Failures for Initiating Event Assessments ................................17
3.1.4 Appropriate Risk Measure for Initiating Event Assessments ..................................................18
3.2 Condition Assessments ..........................................................................................................18
3.2.1 Treatment of Initiating Events for Condition Assessments .....................................................19
3.2.2 Treatment of Components and Common Cause for Condition Assessments............................19
3.2.3 Appropriate Risk Measure for Condition Assessments ..........................................................20
4. OVERVIEW OF THE GEM SOFTWARE ...................................................................................21
4.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................................21
4.2 Using GEM for Initiating Event Assessment...........................................................................21
4.3 Using GEM for Condition Assessments..................................................................................27
4.4 Using GEM for LERF Assessments .......................................................................................31
5. CONCLUSIONS ..........................................................................................................................33
6. REFERENCES.............................................................................................................................35
APPENDIX A – GEMDATA   …………………………………………………..…………….……….A-1 
APPENDIX B – LOOP-RELATED RECOVERIES……….…….….……….………….………...…....B-1 
viii
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Event evaluation methodology. ................................................................................................. 6
Figure 2.  Modification of initiating events during an initiating event assessment. .................................... 14
Figure 3.  Modification of component nonrecovery events during an initiating event assessment............... 16
Figure 4.  Modification of common cause events during an initiating event assessment. ........................... 17
Figure 5.  Example of the increase in risk during the duration of a component outage. ............................. 18
Figure 6.  Starting GEM in Windows. .................................................................................................... 22
Figure 7.  The GEM initiating event list dialog. ...................................................................................... 23
Figure 8.  GEM initiating event assessment event screen. ........................................................................ 24
Figure 9.  The GEM event assessment screen display for initiating event assessments.............................. 25
Figure 10.  Report options available in GEM.......................................................................................... 26
Figure 11. The GEM condition assessment initial dialog. ........................................................................ 28
Figure 12. Modify basic event data screen in GEM................................................................................. 29
Figure 13.  GEM screen to enter the condition assessment duration. ........................................................ 30
Figure 14.  The GEM condition assessment screen. ................................................................................ 30
Figure 15.  The GEM analysis options, including LERF. ........................................................................ 31
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Overview of the important attributes of initiating and condition assessments. ............................ 20
ix
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Incidents at facilities such as nuclear power plants occur at many different times and under a variety of 
conditions.  To evaluate these situations, analysts perform what is known as an “event evaluation.”  To 
perform event evaluations, GEM was developed for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by the 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL).  The technique known as “event evaluations” began around 1977 when 
the NRC Risk Assessment Review Group acknowledged the potential for accident precursor events to 
contribute to the overall plant operational risk. 
An event evaluation represents the use of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model to obtain a risk 
measure that is conditional on the situation that existed during an incident.  GEM allows analysts to 
perform these types of assessments for both initiating event and condition cases. 
This report addressed how the technique of event assessment is performed using the GEM risk analysis 
tool.  Specifically, four areas of interest were discussed: 
? Background material related to event evaluations. 
? A theoretical framework behind event evaluation calculations. 
? Pragmatic considerations when performing event evaluations using GEM. 
? Guidance for performing event evaluations when using the GEM software. 
As part of this analysis framework, the two types of GEM analysis, specifically initiating event (where an 
initiator occurs) and condition (where a component is failed for some length of time) assessments are 
described.  The calculation of an operational risk measure creates a risk profile, over time, conditional 
upon the component outages and plant initiating events that actually occurred during the period of 
interest.  However, what is not being calculated for the nuclear power plant risk profile is the probability 
that severe core damage did happen.  Instead, the risk profile evaluation asks the question: “What could 
happen (i.e., what is the probability of core damage) if the conditions and events that existed over the 
duration of interest were realized at a later time?” 
The conditionality that was estimated on measures such as conditional core damage probability (CCDP) in 
GEM reflects impacts on the measure of interest (i.e., core damage).  Such impacts include scenarios such 
as condition and initiating event assessments (e.g., a component outage or the occurrence of an initiating 
event).  Additional complications such as the potential for common-cause failures, the recovery of failed 
components, and the restoration from initiating events are considered as part of these impacts. 
A method of calculating risk levels for plant operational events was illustrated using GEM.  Two cases 
were considered, first a case where a plant experienced an initiating event (initiating event assessment) and 
second a case where a component was inoperable for a length of time (condition assessment). 
For initiating event assessments, the initiating events in a model must be modified to reflect the event in 
question.  For those initiators that did not occur, they are turned off while for the initiator that did occur, 
its numeric value should be modified depending on the type of initiator, either (a) non-recoverable or (b) 
recoverable.  For these types of events, GEM will determine the CCDP specific to the event. 
x  
For a condition assessment, it is assumed that none of the initiating events (as modeled in the PRA) actually 
occurred.  Although no initiator occurred, there is still a probability that any of the initiating events could 
have occurred during the duration of the event.  Consequently, GEM will account for the probability that 
an initiating event could have occurred.  The initiator probabilities are necessary even if the event duration 
is very short.  For condition assessments, GEM will determine an “event importance” by evaluating the 
difference in the CCDP and CDP, where the CDP is the nominal core damage probability. 
The GEM software has been developed to aid in accident sequence precursor (ASP) event analysis.  It is 
intended to simplify the use of SAPHIRE PRA databases when performing an event assessment.  GEM is 
able to setup default analysis procedures (either initiating event assessments or condition assessment) for 
each of the initiating event types in the SPAR plant models and provides a powerful framework for 
performing event evaluations. 
xi
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed a powerful personal computer (PC) 
software application for performing probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), called Systems Analysis 
Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE). 
Using SAPHIRE on a PC, an analyst can perform a PRA for any complex system, facility, or process. 
Regarding nuclear power plants, SAPHIRE can be used to model a plant’s response to initiating events, 
quantify associated core damage frequencies and identify important contributors to core damage (Level 1 
PRA).  It can also be used to evaluate containment failure and release models for severe accident 
conditions, given that core damage has occurred (Level 2 PRA). It can be used for a PRA assuming that 
the reactor is at full power, at low power, or at shutdown conditions. Furthermore, it can be used to analyze 
both internal and external initiating events, and it has special features for transforming models built for 
internal event analysis to models for external event analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to 
quantify risk for release consequences to both the public and the environment (Level 3 PRA). For all of 
these models, SAPHIRE can evaluate the uncertainty inherent in the probabilistic models. 
SAPHIRE development and maintenance has been undertaken by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). 
The INL began development of a PRA software application on a PC in the mid 1980s when the enormous 
potential of PC applications started being recognized. The initial version, Integrated Risk and Reliability 
Analysis System (IRRAS), was released by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (now Idaho 
National Laboratory) in February 1987. IRRAS was an immediate success, because it clearly demonstrated 
the feasibility of performing reliability and risk assessments on a PC and because of its tremendous need 
(Russell 1987). Development of IRRAS continued over the following years. However, limitations to the 
state of the-art during those initial stages led to the development of several independent modules to 
complement IRRAS capabilities (Russell 1990; 1991; 1992; 1994). These modules were known as Models 
and Results Database (MAR-D), System Analysis and Risk Assessment (SARA), and Fault Tree, Event 
Tree, and Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (FEP).  
IRRAS was developed primarily for performing a Level 1 PRA. It contained functions for creating event 
trees and fault trees, defining accident sequences and basic event failure data, solving system fault trees and 
accident sequence event trees, quantifying cut sets, performing sensitivity and uncertainty analyses, 
documenting the results, and generating reports.  
MAR-D provided the means for loading and unloading PRA data from the IRRAS relational database. 
MAR-D used a simple ASCII data format. This format allowed interchange of data between PRAs 
2performed with different types of software; data of PRAs performed by different codes could be converted 
into the data format appropriate for IRRAS, and vice-versa.  
SARA provided the capability to access PRA data and results (descriptive facility information, failure data, 
event trees, fault trees, plant system model diagrams, and dominant accident sequences) stored in MAR-D. 
With SARA, a user could review and compare results of existing PRAs. It also provided the capability for 
performing limited sensitivity analyses. SARA was intended to provide easier access to PRA results to 
users that did not have the level of sophistication required to use IRRAS.  
FEP provided common access to the suite of graphical editors. The fault tree and event tree editors were 
accessible through FEP as well as through IRRAS, whereas the piping and instrumentation diagram 
(P&ID) editor was only accessible through FEP. With these editors an analyst could construct from scratch 
as well as modify fault tree, event tree, and plant drawing graphical representations needed in a PRA.  
Previous versions of SAPHIRE consisted of the suite of these modules. Taking advantage of the Windows 
95 (or Windows NT) environment, all of these modules were integrated into SAPHIRE Version 6; more 
features were added; and the user interface was simplified. 
With the release of SAPHIRE versions 5 and 6, INL included a separate module called the Graphical 
Evaluation Module (GEM). GEM provides a highly specialized user interface with SAPHIRE, automating 
SAPHIRE process steps for evaluating operational events at commercial nuclear power plants. In 
particular, GEM implements many of the accident sequence precursor (ASP) program analysis methods. 
Using GEM, an analyst can estimate the risk associated with operational events very efficiently and 
expeditiously. 
1.2 The Need for GEM 
The use of a probabilistic risk assessment tool and model to obtain a risk measure or “event evaluation” 
that is conditional on the situation that existed during an incident is a common analysis practice.  To 
perform event evaluations, GEM was developed for the NRC by the INL.  GEM contains a simplified user 
interface that relies on the SAPHIRE analysis engine in order to perform “what if” analysis related to PRA 
incidents. 
The technique known as “event evaluations” began around 1977 when the NRC Risk Assessment Review 
Group acknowledged the potential for accident precursor events to contribute to the overall plant 
operational risk.  This Review Group recommended that “potentially significant sequences, and precursors, 
as they occur, be subjected to the kind of analysis contained in WASH-1400.”  One of the first full-scope 
PRAs, WASH-1400 (also known as the “Reactor Safety Study”) provided a basis for the recommendations 
of the Review Group. 
Following this initial recommendation in utilizing a PRA to make inference based upon quantified 
probabilistic models, the NRC formalized the process of using PRAs for event evaluation.  In 1982, the 
first of a series of NUREG/CR reports was published that addressed the Review Group’s recommendation.  
3Specifically, NUREG/CR-2497, Precursors to Potential Severe Core Damage Accidents:  1969-1979, A 
Status Report, was finished and addressed precursor events from the 1969 to 1979 time period.  Following 
the successful completion of this analysis, other NUREG/CR reports in the series addressed precursor 
events for subsequent years in order to provide a historical perspective on the operation of nuclear power 
plants in the U.S.  These additional reports are known as the ASP analyses documents. 
While these older analyses utilized simplistic PRA models, tools, and evaluation techniques, current 
analyses (and models) have become much more complex.  The development of the GEM software 
attempted to address the complexities of both simplifying and standardizing the analysis steps required by 
the analysts performing event evaluations.  To perform an event evaluation, several processes must be 
completed prior to the actual analysis of an incident such as understanding the incident and collecting data 
related to the analysis.  This report does not address these “pre-analysis” issues.  However, this report 
discusses four areas of interest related to the use and understanding of the GEM software when performing 
event evaluations: 
 1. A theoretical framework behind event evaluation calculations. 
 2. Considerations when performing event evaluations using GEM. 
 3. Guidance and examples for performing event evaluations when using the GEM  
  software. 
4. Application and use of the GEMDATA module to edit GEM-specific analysis parameters 
such as initiating event and failed component recovery. 
4
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2. GENERAL EVENT EVALUATION FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Introduction 
An event evaluation is completed using a PRA model to obtain a measure of risk that is conditional on the 
situation existing during an event or specific situation.  A PRA model is modified to account for specific 
initiators, failures, or conditions that occurred during the event in question. (Smith, 1998) 
Two types of event analysis are used for the analysis of events. 
• Events involving an initiator.  These are called initiating event assessments.
  Examples: 1. Offsite power was lost during a storm while at full power. 
    2. A shipping cask was dropped during transportation. 
 3. An electric generator stopped supplying power to a critical  
  bus. 
• Events involving a reduction in safety system reliability or function for a specific 
  duration.  These are called condition assessments.
  Examples: 1. A manual valve was installed improperly and was inoperable 
     for several months. 
    2. A generator fuel supply was found empty due to a leak. 
Figure 1 illustrates two general steps that take place during the event evaluation:  (1) mapping the incident 
context into the PRA and (2) using PRA to determine the incident-specific risk measure.  To complete these 
steps, gathering detailed information from the event is important.  Knowledge of the system design and 
operation, along with details found in the PRA model, will help to better map the incident into the PRA 
model. 
6Figure 1.  Event evaluation methodology.
Questions such as equipment recoverability and the potential for common cause failures complicate the 
modeling of typical events.  Types of information that are needed for an event evaluation include: 
? Chronology of actions during event. 
? Operator actions including recovery of systems. 
? Equipment failures and failure causes. 
? Equipment unavailabilities (e.g., equipment out for testing) 
? Conditions that may have hindered operation. 
? Cause of initiating event (if applicable). 
“Mapping” the event into the PRA model is a prerequisite to obtaining event evaluation measures.  This 
mapping is the process of structuring the PRA to represent the conditions of the incident (either actual or 
hypothetical) being modeled.  In other words, the context surrounding the incident is imposed on the PRA 
boundary conditions.  Once the PRA model is selected, then the following steps must be performed: 
? Adjust the initiating events depending on the type of event being evaluated. 
? Determine the impact on system reliability, which potentially include: 
Gather Event 
Information 
Perform the 
Event Evaluation 
1. Map Context into the PRA 
2. Use PRA to obtain risk 
metric 
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  1. Model failed, unavailable, or degraded components. 
  2. Modify common cause failure probabilities. 
  3. Adjust nonrecovery probabilities where needed. 
  4.  Change the structure/assumptions of the PRA model. 
? After mapping the event into the PRA, risk measures for the event can be calculated. 
? Several different types of risk measures could be used to evaluate the risk significance of 
an event.  For example, if dealing with a nuclear power plant issue, one could find a 
conditional probability of core damage (CCDP) given a specified initial state. 
An event “importance” (or increase) can be found by subtracting the nominal core damage probability 
(CDP) from the CCDP.  Alternatively, the ratio measure of the CCDP divided by the CDP could be used.  
For these calculations, traditional importance measures can also be obtained for the basic events in the 
PRA cut sets.  Examples of these importance measures include Fussell-Vesely, Birnbaum, and Risk 
Increase Ratio (a.k.a., RAW).  Uncertainty analysis of the results via Monte Carlo sampling is also 
possible. 
2.2 Conditional Probability Calculations 
Conditional probability calculations estimate the probability of a negative outcome (e.g., core damage) 
given that an event or condition occurred.  For nuclear power plants, the general expression for the CCDP 
given condition Z existing is 
where P(Z) > 0 and 
?
n
i
iCCD
1?
?
where Ci is the i’th core damage cut set and U is the union of these cut sets.  
As a demonstration of the CCDP calculation: 
P(CD|Z) = P(CD ? Z) / P(Z) = CCDP 
8Example #1:  Assume that the (nominal) minimal cut sets are 
   CD = IE*A*B + IE*A*C + IE*B*C + IE*D . 
where, for conciseness, “*” indicates the logical AND operation and “+” indicates the logical OR 
operation.  To get core damage (CD), an initiating event (IE) is necessary and then either (1) A and B fail, 
(2) A and C fail, (3) B and C fail, or (4) D fails.  The condition in this model is that initiator IE occurred 
while component C was inoperable (and was not recoverable).  Thus, it is necessary to calculate 
P(CD| IE =True and C=True) 
(i.e., the CCDP if this is a nuclear power plant PRA). 
Assuming that the events IE, A, B, C, and D are independent and their probabilities can be written as P(IE) 
= ie, P(A) = a, P(B) = b, P(C) = c, and P(D) = d, the CD equation can be rewritten as 
P(CD)    = P(IE*A*B + IE*A*C + IE*B*C + IE*D) 
Now, this is effectively the expression for the minimal cut sets that one would obtain using a fault 
tree/event tree tool like SAPHIRE.  When a set of minimal cut sets exists, only those cut sets need to be 
quantified to obtain results.  In general, there are many ways to quantify the union of minimal cut sets.  
However, in PRA, it is standard to use one of three methods, which include: 
1. Rare event approximation. 
This calculation approximates the probability of the union of minimal cut sets.  The equation for 
the rare event approximation is 
?
?
?
m
i
iCP
1
where P is the probability of interest, Ci is the probability of the i'th cut set, and m is the total 
number of cut sets. 
2. Minimal cut set upper bound. 
This calculation approximates the probability of the union of minimal cut sets.  The equation for 
the minimal cut set upper bound is 
)1(1
1
?
?
???
m
i
iCP
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where P is the probability of interest, Ci is the probability of the i'th cut set, and m is the total 
number of cut sets.  Note (1) that the capital pi symbol implies multiplication and (2) most PRA 
tools, including SAPHIRE, utilize this equation as the default method of quantification. 
3. Exact. 
There are various methods of determining the exact probability given a set of cut sets.  The most 
common approach is commonly referred by the name "inclusion-exclusion."  Others include 
solutions via binary decision diagrams. 
For this case, the nominal (unconditional) equation for Example #1 must first be quantified and then 
evaluated using both the rare event approximation and the minimal cut set upperbound. 
Rare event approximation: 
)()()()(
4
1
DIEPCBIEPCAIEPBAIEPCP
i
i ?????????????
?
       
Minimal cut set upper bound:  
? ?? ?? ?? ?)(1)(1)(1)(11)1(1
4
1
DIEPCBIEPCAIEPBAIEPCP
i
i ???????????????? ?
?
The condition for Example #1 was that the evaluation of initiator IE occur while component C is inoperable 
(and was not recoverable).  Thus, the CCDP is: 
 P(CD| IE=True, C=True)    = P(A + B + D) 
Rare event approximation: 
          = P(A) + P(B) + P(D)  = a + b + d . 
Minimal cut set upper bound:  
          = 1 – [1 – P(A)][1 – P(B)][1 – P(D)]  = 1 – (1 – a)(1 – b)(1 – d) . 
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To calculate the CCDP, the values for the event probabilities are needed.  For this example, assume: 
 P(IE| IE occurred) = 1 
 P(A) = 1 × 10-1
 P(B) = 2 × 10-1
 P(C) = 5 × 10-2
 P(D) = 5 × 10-3 . 
The CCDP using the assumed probability values is: 
Rare event approximation: 
  P(CD| IE=True, C=True) =  a + b + d  =  (0.1) + (0.2) + (0.005) 
      =  0.305 . 
Minimal cut set upper bound:  
  P(CD| IE=True, C=True) =  1 – (1 – a)(1 – b)(1 – d) 
      =  1 – (1 – 0.1)(1 – 0.2)(1 – 0.005) 
      =  0.284 . 
Thus, the conditional core damage probability, or CCDP, given that initiator IE occurs while component C 
is inoperable (and is not recoverable) is about 0.28. 
2.3 Event Importance Calculations 
Event importance calculations attempt to estimate the change of the probability given that an event or 
condition occurred.  The GEM software is designed to automatically perform this calculation.  The 
definition of this event importance calculation is (where component Z fails): 
Importanceevent = CCDP  -  CDP 
where CCDP is the conditional core damage probability given Z fails and CDP is the nominal core 
damage probability. 
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Note that the Importanceevent calculation is a difference of two probabilities, and, as such, is not a 
probability (hence the name “Importance”).  For example, the CCDP could be lower than the CDP (if a 
hypothetical design improvement is being proposed), thereby resulting in a negative Importanceevent value.  
However, the Importanceevent gives a sense of the relative differences between the two probabilities. 
12
   
13
3. THE TWO TYPES OF GEM EVENT EVALUATIONS  
3.1 Initiating Event Assessments 
Components or systems that are inoperable at the time the initiator occurs increase the overall risk 
of the event.  A CDP can be calculated that is conditional upon the initiator occurring and the 
initial conditions of the event.  Typical initiating events (in nuclear power plants) that are available 
for modeling purposes include: 
? Trip (including loss of condenser, loss of main feedwater, and anticipated 
transients without scram). 
? Loss of offsite power. 
? Steam generator tube rupture. 
? Small, medium, or large break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). 
? Inadvertent/stuck open relief valve. 
? Loss of a DC bus. 
? Loss of service water. 
? Loss of component cooling water. 
? Interfacing-systems LOCA. 
? Excessive LOCA. 
For an initiating event analysis, GEM will allow the analyst to model the scenario where one of 
these initiating events has occurred.  The CCDP that is quantified by GEM is representative of a 
instantaneous risk increase for the event.  To measure this risk from a PRA, it is important to note 
that the results of the PRA model may be described by two parts: 
? ?(t) is the initiating event rate 
? ?(t) is the conditional probability of core damage given the initiating event. 
Knowing these two parts, any type of event assessment can be performed by adjusting the relevant 
portions of the PRA.  For example, the product ?(t) ? ?(t) is the core damage frequency.  However, 
the CCDP for initiating event assessment is simply ?(t) conditional on the initiator that occurred 
and any complicating conditions. 
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3.1.1 Treatment of Initiating Events for Initiating Event Assessments 
For initiating event assessments, the initiating events in a model must be modified to reflect the 
event in question.  First, for those initiators that did not occur, they are set to a FALSE house 
event.  Since initiating events are ANDed with the sequence cut set basic events, sequences with a 
FALSE house event in every cut set will not show up in the results.  In other words, the other 
initiators did not happen.  Second, for the initiator that did occur, its numeric value should be 
modified depending on the type of initiator, either (a) non-recoverable or (b) recoverable. 
? Non-recoverable Initiators – Set the initiating event to a TRUE house event (or probability 
of 1.0). For example, in the case where offsite power is lost (LOOP), and if there is no 
chance of recovering offsite power, the initiating event should be set to a TRUE house 
event. 
? Recoverable Initiators – Set the initiating event to a representative “nonrecovery” 
probability.  For example, in the case where offsite power is lost and it is recovered (i.e., is 
recoverable), then the initiator should be set to its short-term nonrecovery probability. 
For initiating event assessment, the initiating events should be modified according to the flow 
diagram below in Figure 2. 
Figure 2.  Modification of initiating events during an initiating event assessment. 
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3.1.2 Treatment of Component Recovery for Initiating Event Assessments 
The components or systems that are inoperable at the time the initiator occurs need to be evaluated 
in order to determine whether they are recoverable.  If a component or system is not recoverable, it 
(and its nonrecovery event, if present) should be set to TRUE.  Setting a component or system to a 
TRUE house event indicates that the component or system is failed (i.e., not able to perform its 
intended function).  Failed components or systems will not show up in the resulting sequence cut 
sets.  Rather, the TRUE house event will alter the logic that is used in the PRA model.  Reasons 
why a component or system may not be recoverable include: 
? Nonrepairable (in the time available) component failure 
? Harsh environment (e.g., high radiation, high temperature) 
? Location (e.g., inside containment versus outside) 
? Timing/staffing limitations 
If a component or system is recoverable, its nonrecovery basic event should be set to an 
appropriate nonrecovery probability.  If a nonrecovery event is not present, then set the component 
event to an appropriate nonrecovery probability. 
In summary, the component-level nonrecovery should be incorporated into the PRA according to 
the flow diagram below in Figure 3. When using this process, one should be aware that setting a 
component to TRUE may affect how the “recovery rules” are applied (for more on recovery rules, 
refer to the Technical Reference Manual, Volume 2). 
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Figure 3.  Modification of component nonrecovery events during an initiating event assessment. 
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3.1.3 Treatment of Common Cause Failures for Initiating Event Assessments 
Many PRA models have common cause failures (CCF) included in the fault tree logic.  These CCF 
events are generally either train-level or component-level events.  For those components or systems 
which are operable (or in standby and are potentially operable) at the time of the initiating event, 
no modifications are needed for their common cause failure parameters.  However, during an event 
evaluation, GEM is going to estimate "what is the probability" conditional upon the incident, or in 
other words, how close was the incident to proceeding to a PRA-type consequence.  If a component 
or train is inoperable at the time of the initiating event, three steps must be performed (and is 
shown in Figure 4). 
1. Identify the failure attributes (i.e., cause factors) for inoperable equipment to determine 
how to treat the failed component. 
2. Calculate a new CCF probability based upon failure. 
3. Modify the CCF probability in the PRA model.  Note that the SPAR models in use will 
automatically modify the CCF since they use the SAPHIRE CCF module. 
Question
the need to
include CCF
on remaining,
redundant
components
Manually
adjust CCF
probability
to account
for Incident
No Yes
No Yes
Does
PRA use
SAPHIRE CCF
Module?
Does
Component
have CCF
event?
Component To
TRUE – CCF
Automatically
Adjusted
Figure 4.  Modification of common cause events during an initiating event assessment. 
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3.1.4 Appropriate Risk Measure for Initiating Event Assessments 
In GEM, the risk measure for initiating event assessments is the CCDP.  This measure is 
conditional upon both a particular initiating event occurring (and the others not occurring) and the 
component, train, or system that are inoperable at the time the initiator occurs.  An event 
importance (i.e., Importanceevent) is not generally calculated for initiating event assessments since 
the determination of the CDP may not be obvious (e.g., is instantaneous probability or the 
probability over a short duration needed?). 
3.2 Condition Assessments 
An event assessment analyses is performed in order to quantify the risk due to a particular event.  
For condition assessments, the risk arises due to a component or system (or more than one) being 
inoperable for a certain length of time and no initiator actually occurred during this time.  The 
“length of time” is the duration over which the risk is measured.  This duration of increased risk is 
shown in Figure 5.  In this figure, ?(t) is the initiating event hazard rate and ?(t) is the conditional 
probability of core damage given an initiating event. 
Figure 5.  Example of the increase in risk during the duration of a component outage. 
For component outages, GEM assumes that the risk is assumed constant over the duration of the 
event.  This constant (the ?' ?' from Figure 5) is the conditional risk result given by the PRA 
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model.   If the configuration changes (say due to maintenance, testing, or other failures), then there 
is a new risk level.   
3.2.1 Treatment of Initiating Events for Condition Assessments 
For a condition assessment, it is assumed that none of the initiating events (as modeled in the PRA) 
actually occurred.  Although no initiator occurred, there is still a probability that any of the 
initiating events could have occurred during the duration of the event.  Consequently, GEM will 
account for this probability that an initiating event could have occurred.  The initiator probabilities 
are necessary even if the event duration is very short compared to the expected arrival rates of the 
initiating events. 
The probability of more than one initiator is usually negligible, but the calculation for the initiator 
probability accounts for such situations.  Assuming that the arrival of an initiating event can be 
modeled as a standard Poisson process, the probability of core damage is expressed as 
TedamagecoreP ????? 1)(
where:  ? is the arrival rate of the initiating event (with units of inverse time) 
? is the probability of the accident sequence cut sets 
  T is the duration (with units of time). 
This calculation assumes the ? and ? are constant over time T. 
3.2.2 Treatment of Components and Common Cause for Condition Assessments 
The components or systems that are inoperable during the entire duration need to be evaluated in 
order to determine whether they are potentially recoverable.  For this evaluation step, the treatment 
of components for condition assessments is identical to that presented for initiating event 
assessment (Section 3.1.2).  The treatment of common cause failures is the same as that in the 
initiating event assessment section (Section 3.1.3). 
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3.2.3 Appropriate Risk Measure for Condition Assessments 
?
In GEM, the risk measure that is used for condition assessments is the “event importance” (i.e., 
Importanceevent).  The event importance for core damage models is 
   Importanceevent = CCDP  -  CDP 
where CCDP is the conditional core damage probability 
 CDP is the nominal core damage probability. 
This measure is conditional upon both the probability of any initiating event occurring during the 
event duration and components, trains, or systems that are inoperable for the duration of the event.  
However, while the Importanceevent is the primary risk measure used, GEM calculates both the 
CCDP and CDP and provides these as part of the results. 
Below, Table 1 compares the two types of event evaluations, showing the unique identifying 
attributes for the two types of event assessments, how initiators are treated, how component events 
are modified, and the applicable risk metrics. 
Table 1.  Overview of the important attributes of initiating and condition assessments. 
Assessment Type
Item Initiating Event Assessment Condition Assessment
Unique Attributes
Initiating event happens 
(point in time) 
One (or more) component is unavailable 
for some duration of time (t1 -> t2)
Initiating event did not occur 
Treatment of Initiating 
Events
Set initiator to 1.0 (or non-recovery 
probability) for the initiating event that 
occurred. 
Others initiators are set to zero. 
CCDP = 1-exp[-? (?i ?i ) T] 
where, 
?i = i’th initiator frequency 
?i = P(CD | i’th initiator) 
T = duration of condition
Treatment of 
Components
Failed components –> TRUE (or 
nonrecovery probability) and adjust 
CCF.
Non-failed components –> leave at 
their nominal failure probabilities 
Failed components –> TRUE (or 
nonrecovery probability) and adjust CCF. 
Non-failed components –> leave at their 
nominal failure probabilities 
Risk Metric CCDP Ie = CCDP - CDP 
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4. OVERVIEW OF THE GEM SOFTWARE  
4.1 Introduction 
The GEM software has been developed to aid in accident sequence precursor (ASP) event analysis.  
It is intended to simplify the use of SAPHIRE PRA databases when performing an event 
assessment.  GEM automates the analysis procedure and provides result reports in the format used 
in the ASP program.  GEM is able to setup default analysis procedures (either initiating event 
assessments or condition assessment) for each of the initiating event types in the SPAR plant 
models.   For these analyses, the primary purpose of GEM is to interface with the SAPHIRE 
analysis module. 
GEM uses the SAPHIRE cut set generation and quantification routines to solve sequences in the 
SAPHIRE database.  Further, GEM stores the results of sequence quantification in the project’s 
SAPHIRE database.  GEM stores the quantification result in one of the reserved analysis types in 
SAPHIRE: 
? ASP_CONDITION for the condition assessments 
? ASP_INIT_EVENT for the initiating event assessments 
While the analysis results are viewable in GEM, these results can also be reviewed and 
manipulated from within SAPHIRE.  In addition, GEM uses its own database to store information 
about each model – this database is known as GEMDATA.  While the use of GEM DATA has 
been superseded by the circa 2005 SPAR models, information on GEMDATA for older models 
may be found in Appendix A. 
4.2 Using GEM for Initiating Event Assessment 
This section demonstrates how GEM was used to evaluate events that involve initiators.  As an 
example of initiating event assessment, the evaluation of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event at a 
nuclear power plant follows, as well as:   
? The event to be modeled,  
? The preliminary steps to an analysis of the event,  
? A walk through of the use of GEM to evaluate the event 
GEM was used to determine the probability of a core damage event as a result of a LOOP event.  
GEM’s built-in analysis procedure handled most of the details for the analysis.  To model the 
scenario, the basic events in the model were modified to map the event into the model.  Then the 
appropriate changes were entered through the GEM Initiating Event Analysis interface. 
The hypothetical event is as follows.  A brush fire near the plant caused the offsite transmission 
lines to fault.  The emergency diesels started and operated as designed.  Although offsite power 
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was restored in 5 minutes, emergency busses were supplied by the diesels for 24 hours.  Two days 
after the LOOP, the low-pressure injection (LPI) A pump recirculation line was found to be 
obstructed with plastic sheeting material.  The material was determined to have been in the 
recirculation line since the last refueling outage 30 days before the LOOP.  This event was 
considered to be a grid-related loss-of-offsite power initiating event. 
The failed LPI pump was accounted for separately.  For this example, the obstruction was the 
assumed reason the pump failed to start.  If a pump could not start, it also could not run (assuming 
no recovery from the initial failure). After reviewing the PRA model, the recirculation line failure 
was modeled by setting basic events 
 LPI-MDP-FR-P015 to TRUE 
 LPI-MDP-FS-P015 to TRUE 
The GEM software was started and the data was entered using the following procedures. 
GEM was started by clicking on the GEM icon in the “SAPHIRE for Windows” program group 
under the “Windows Start” button (see Figure 6).  In addition to using the “Windows Start” menu, 
the GEM or SAPHIRE icons may be put directly on the desktop as a shortcut. 
   Figure 6.  Starting GEM in Windows.
   
23
Next, the “Initiating Event Assessment” option was selected from the main Gem Menu.  A new 
assessment was made by clicking the right mouse button  and selecting the “New” option.  The 
assessment was given a name (up to 24 characters) and a description in order to make a record in 
the SAPHIRE database that will hold the assessment.  Finally, <Enter> was pressed or the Save 
button was clicked in order to continue. 
After GEM displayed the Initiating Events screen (see Figure 7), the assessment that most closely 
matched was chosen by double clicking on it. 
Figure 7.  The GEM initiating event list dialog. 
For example, if the LOOP initiator was chosen, the cursor would be moved to the IE-LOOP line 
and the left mouse button would be double clicked .  For LOOP-related initiating event 
assessments, GEM has been designed to further query the user to select the type of initiating events 
(additional information on LOOP treatment is provided in Appendix B).  The list of sub-type 
LOOPs varies, but a typical list will be (Atwood, 1998): 
? Grid related 
? Plant centered 
? Switchyard 
? Weather related 
The LOOP in the example was “grid related,” so “GRID RELATED” was selected and  <Enter> 
was pressed.  For initiating event assessments, only one initiator was selected.  Continuing with the 
assessment, either the assessment record was double clicked  or the record was highlighted and 
the “Select” button was clicked.  On the “IE Assessment Events” screen (Figure 8) basic event 
probabilities were added or modified (if necessary) before being saved with the analysis record. 
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Figure 8.  GEM initiating event assessment event screen. 
Initially, GEM added a few events to the list (20 basic events as shown in Figure 8) indicating that 
these events were modified from their nominal values.  For example, the non-LOOP initiators were 
all set to FALSE (a probability of zero) since these initiators did not occur.  At this point, other 
events were added to the list, specifically the events related to the LPI pump failure, by clicking the 
right mouse button  and then, selecting the “Add” option. 
The event LPI-MDP-FR-P015 was selected by scrolling the list or by simply typing in the first few 
characters of the event name (i.e., L, P, I, -, M, etc.).  Once the event was found, it was highlighted 
and chosen by double clicking  the event (or right click and select Add), which began the 
probability change process.  On the next dialog, the basic event LPI-MDP-FR-P015 was set to 
TRUE, indicating failure, and the OK button was clicked. 
Once the OK button was clicked, GEM added the LPI event to the change list.  The previous steps 
were repeated to set LPI-MDP-FS-P015 to TRUE also.  At this point, the steps to setting up the 
analysis were finished and the Process button was clicked. 
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GEM processed the analysis and, when finished, displayed the “Event Assessment” screen (see 
Figure 9).  The total CCDP for the event was displayed at the bottom of the screen (8.8E-5).  The 
accident sequences contributing to the CCDP was displayed and sorted from highest (4.5E-5) to 
lowest CCDP (1.5E-12). 
Figure 9.  The GEM event assessment screen display for initiating event assessments. 
At this point, by clicking the right mouse button  over the dialog window, other options were 
available.  For example, by highlighting all the sequences, right clicking, and then selecting one of 
the Importance options the conditional importance measures (e.g., Fussell-Vesely, risk increase 
ratio) appeared.  The “Event Assessment” screen also allowed a review of the results and printed 
pre-formatted reports.  By clicking the right mouse button  over the dialog box then selecting the 
“Report” option, GEM displayed the Report Options screen. 
Several report options were available (see Figure 10).  The report was viewed on screen through 
the default option and by pressing the Ok button.  To print to the default printer, the option was 
changed to “Print (Default Printer),” which can change the “report truncation” values from 100.0 
(%) to 90 or 95 in order to minimize the volume of paper needed for the report. 
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Figure 10.  Report options available in GEM. 
A plain text file can be made by changing the option to File and entering a valid file path and name.  
To make a WordPerfect file, the option was changed to File and the file name was filled in.  Then, 
the Target WordPerfect File option was checked. 
The Stream Report option, when checked, output the report as a single, continuous results list.  
Otherwise, the report contained breaks for page information. 
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4.3 Using GEM for Condition Assessments 
To use GEM to evaluate events that involve component degraded conditions – these are defined as 
operational occurrences (both real and hypothetical) that can not be modeled as initiating events.  
Instead, a condition exists that degrades the ability of the plant to respond to upsets over a period 
of time.   
As an example of a condition assessment, the evaluation of a diesel generator unavailability event 
at a nuclear power plant follows.  Topics to be covered will include: 
? A discussion of the preliminary steps to analyze an event. 
? A demonstration of GEM to evaluate the event. 
The basic approach to the condition type of evaluation will be to determine the CCDP for the event 
occurring during the period in which the diesel was disabled.   Then this CCDP will be compared 
with the CDP for the same period had the diesel not been known to have been failed (i.e., in its 
nominal state).  The difference in these two probabilities is a quantity known as the event 
importance. 
In the hypothetical example, a diesel generator failed a periodic functional test.  When repair crews 
investigated, they found that the diesel generator in division 2B of ac power (the number 3 diesel) 
had a plugged fuel filter.  It may have been non-functional since the last operational check.  Some 
other relevant facts are: 
? Investigation showed that the machine had only been non-functional for 100 hours. 
? The other diesel (number 2 in division 2A of ac power) was also checked, but the 
plugging was found only in Diesel Generator 3. 
? There was no evidence that, had there been a diesel demand during this period, 
recovery of the diesels would have been affected by other (non-filter) issues. 
First, the specific model modifications were determined.  The event description stated that Diesel 
Generator 3 was failed for 100 hours, and that the failure appeared to be a potential “common 
cause.”  After reviewing the PRA, this event was mapped into the model by setting the basic event 
EPS-DGN-FS-DG3 to TRUE.  In addition, EPS-DGN-FR-DG3 was set to TRUE (since the diesel 
can not run if it does not start).   
Second, to enter the data, GEM was started by clicking on the GEM icon in the SAPHIRE for 
Windows program group. 
From the GEM main menu, the “Condition Assessment” option was selected.  A new assessment 
was made by clicking the right mouse button  and selecting the “New” option.  The analysis was 
provided with a name (up to 24 characters) and description, then <Enter> was pressed or the Save 
button was clicked. 
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GEM displayed the Condition Assessments screen as shown in Figure 11 (this dialog listed all of 
the condition assessments as they were made).   
    Figure 11. The GEM condition assessment initial dialog. 
At this point, the assessment to be evaluated was selected by either double-clicking the left mouse 
button  on the assessment or by highlighting the assessment and clicking the "Select" button.  
Selecting the assessment brought up an empty dialog box labeled “Condition Assessment Event.”  
This dialog specified the components that were out for the duration of interest.  To model the 
specific event from the example, failure of the diesel generator 3 was added to the list of relevant 
events by clicking the right mouse button  on the dialog box, and selecting the Add option.   
Next, a search for the event EPS-DGN-FS-DG3 was performed by scrolling the list or by simply 
typing in the first few characters of the event name (i.e., E, P, S, -, D, etc.). 
Once the event was found and highlighted, double clicking  the event to began the probability 
change process.  The screen shown in Figure 12 appeared, allowing changes to be made to the 
diesel generator event.  The basic event EPS-DGN-FS-DG3 was set to TRUE and the OK button 
was clicked. The steps were repeated for EPS-DGN-FR-DG3. 
The analysis began once “Process” was selected. 
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Figure 12. Modify basic event data screen in GEM. 
After GEM completed the cut set evaluation (using the probability modification to the diesel 
generator basic events), it asked for the duration of this configuration.  In this example, 100 hours 
was entered and the Ok button was clicked (see Figure 13). 
GEM processed the analysis and then showed the “Condition Assessment” screen (see Figure 14).  
The CCDP, CDP, and Importanceevent for the analysis were displayed.  Again, the accident 
sequences that contributed to the risk were displayed and sorted from highest to lowest 
Importanceevent.  The analysis report options were the same as those discussed in Section 4.2. 
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Figure 13.  GEM screen to enter the condition assessment duration. 
Figure 14.  The GEM condition assessment screen. 
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4.4 Using GEM for LERF Assessments 
The “LERF” option in GEM (Figure 15) allows a user to select an existing initiating event 
assessment or condition assessment; a change set; or create a new assessment, but evaluate the 
assessment using a large early release frequency (LERF) end state gather instead of the core 
damage sequences.  GEM has been designed to look specifically for sequences labeled “PDS-“ 
(either on the event tree graphic or created via event tree partition rules).  As such, the plant model 
must be designed such that only LERF sequences are assigned to end states beginning with “PDS-“ 
for the correct LERF results to be generated.  In addition to the correct end state assignments, the 
model must be specified as “LERF-enabled” (see Vol. 3, section 9.2.9). 
Figure 15.  The GEM analysis options, including LERF. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Incidents at facilities such as nuclear power plants occur at many different times and under a 
variety of conditions.  To evaluate these situations, the GEM software has been developed to 
perform what is known as an “event evaluation.”  An “event evaluation” represents the use of a 
PRA model to obtain a risk measure that is conditional on the situation which existed during an 
incident.  GEM allows analysts to perform these types of assessments for both initiating event and 
condition cases. 
This report addressed how the technique of event assessment is performed using the GEM risk 
analysis tool.  Specifically, four areas of interest were discussed: 
? Background material related to event evaluations. 
? A theoretical framework behind event evaluation calculations. 
? Pragmatic considerations when performing event evaluations using GEM. 
? Guidance for performing event evaluations when using the GEM software. 
The calculation of an operational risk measure attempts to create a risk profile, over time, 
conditional upon the component outages and plant initiating events that actually occurred during 
the period of interest.  However, what is not being calculated for the nuclear power plant risk 
profile is the probability that severe core damage did happen.  Instead, the risk profile that deserves 
attention asks the question: 
“What could happen (i.e., what is the probability of core damage) if the conditions and 
events that existed over the duration of interest were realized at a later time?” 
The conditionality that was estimated on measures such as CCDP in GEM reflects impacts on the 
measure of interest (i.e., core damage).  Such impacts included the scenarios that have been 
discussed including condition and initiating event assessments (e.g., a component outage or the 
occurrence of an initiating event).   
Lastly, a method of calculating risk levels for plant operational events was illustrated using GEM.  
This risk calculation, a CCDP or Importanceevent, relied on the availability of a PRA model.  
Consequently, deficiencies in the PRA model itself, including errors, limitations, scoping issues, 
and questions of completeness, all could cause the resulting GEM calculations to be suspect.  
Investing the resources to build a risk model and then subsequently using that model as part of 
nuclear power plant operation obligates the users to ensure the quality of the PRA model.  It is only 
after model quality issues have been resolved can analysts focus on the quality of operational risk 
calculations.
34
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APPENDIX A – GEMDATA 
Early versions of GEM have its own “stand alone” database called GEMDATA.  The GEMDATA 
database has been prepared by the analyst who developed the SPAR models.  The GEMDATA 
database contains the information needed to set up the ASP default analyses. 
The GEM database contains or calculates the following information for each plant: 
? The initiating events in the model 
? The short-term nonrecovery probability for each initiating event, including offsite power 
nonrecovery probabilities for 
- Plant-centered 
- Grid-related 
- Severe-weather-related 
- Extreme-weather-related LOOP events 
? For these short-term nonrecovery probabilities, several parameters are stored 
- Default recovery classes  
- EP fail time (i.e., time at which LOOP occurred) 
- DG median repair time 
- Core uncovery time and short-term recovery time 
- Plant recovery time and battery depletion time  
- RCP Seal design. 
Note that SPAR models constructed after 2005 do not use the GEMDATA information.  However, 
for earlier databases, the information contained in this section is applicable. 
The link between GEM data and SAPHIRE data is established through the project name, so by 
changing a model’s project name it will no longer be linked to its GEM data. 
GEMDATA is an independent database management and computation software system with the 
primary purpose of calculating various electric power non-recovery probabilities and the reactor 
coolant pump (RCP) seal loss of coolant accident (LOCA) probability.  GEMDATA is not a part 
of GEM and is not generally included in the standard distribution of the SAPHIRE software 
package.  However, it does have the same general user interface and operating style of GEM and 
SAPHIRE. 
GEMDATA stores and processes the information necessary to determine the proper short-term and 
long-term offsite non-recovery values and the probability of an RCP seal LOCA given a LOOP.   
GEMDATA has five options available from its Menu Bar: 
? File 
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? List Init Events 
? Modify 
? Reports 
? Utilities 
Selecting the “File” option, allows the creation of a new GEMDATA database, opens an existing 
GEMDATA database, or exits out of the program.  Selecting “List Init Events” shows the user the 
currently available initiating events in the database (Figure A-1).  By highlighting and double-
clicking on a specific initiating event, the user can modify the various recovery data for that 
specific initiator.  
Figure A-1.  Initiating events list in GEMDATA. 
Selecting “Modify” allows for the analyst to modify the plant, class and recovery event data for 
each specific plant (Figure A-2).  Modifying the various “Class” data allows for the adjustment 
calculation variables for the plant-centered, grid, severe weather and extremely severe weather non-
recovery LOOP probabilities.   Modifying the “Plant” data allows for the adjustment of assigned 
LOOP classes for each specific plant.  This option also allows for the adjustment of the core 
uncovering time, battery depletion time, diesel repair time, short term recovery time and the reactor 
coolant pump seal design type.  A brief description of the available Plant data is provided below: 
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Figure A-2.  Modify plant information screen in GEMDATA. 
Plant_centered LOOP classs- Each plant has been assigned to one of three plant-centered LOOP 
classes based on the expected frequency of experiencing a plant-centered LOOP.  Class I1 has the 
lowest frequency for a plant-centered LOOP of a given duration.  Class I3 has the highest 
frequency and Class I2 is roughly half way in between the other two.  These classes are defined 
and further explained in NUREG-1032a.
Grid LOOP class - Each plant has been assigned to one of four grid classes based on the 
reliability of the offsite power grid.  Class G1 has the lowest frequency of grid loss (less than 1 per 
60 site years) and Class G4 has the highest frequency of grid loss (greater than 1 per 6 site years).  
Classes G2 and G3 have grid loss frequencies between the other two.  See NUREG-1032 for more 
details. 
Grid recovery class - Each plant is assigned to one of two grid recovery types.  Type R1 is 
assigned to plants that have the capability and procedures to recover offsite (nonemergency) AC 
power to the site within 0.5 hour following a grid blackout.  Type R2 is assigned to all other 
plants.  
Severe weather LOOP class - Each plant is assigned to one of five severe weather classes based 
on the frequency of experiencing a loss of offsite power due to severe weather conditions.  Severe 
weather conditions include lightning, rain, hail, sleet, snow, moderately high winds, and other 
weather related causes that do not greatly affect the time to restore power.  Class S1 has the lowest 
frequency of offsite power loss (less than 1 per 333 site years) and Class S5 has the highest 
frequency (greater than 1 per 10 site years).   
                                               
a U.S. NRC, NUREG-1032, Evaluation of Station Blackout Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants,
June 1988. 
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Severe weather recovery class - Each plant is assigned to one of two severe weather recovery 
types.  Type R1 is assigned to plants that have the capability and procedures to recover offsite 
(nonemergency) AC power to the site within 2 hours following a severe-weather-induced loss of 
offsite power.  Type R2 is assigned to all other plants.   
Extremely severe weather LOOP class - Each plant is assigned to one of five extremely severe 
weather classes based on the frequency of experiencing a loss of offsite power due to extremely 
severe weather conditions.  Extremely severe weather conditions include tornadoes, hurricanes, 
very high winds, large accumulations of snow and ice, and other weather related causes that create 
conditions so that power cannot be restored for a long period of time.  Class SS1 has the lowest 
frequency of loss of offsite power (less than 1 per 3,333 site years) and SS5 has the highest 
frequency (greater than 1 per 100 site years).   
RCP seal design - Each PWR plant is assigned to one of seven RCP seal design categories based 
on the plant configuration for resisting and mitigating a seal LOCA given a loss of offsite power.  
BWR plants do not have entries in this field in the database.   The seal LOCA probability models 
are based on the NUREG 11502 work and include models for the following designs: Westinghouse 
old O-ring, Westinghouse new O-ring, and seal return isolation.  Additionally, models have been 
developed to simulate a select set of unique modeling conditions.  These include: seals never fail, 
seals fail in 0.5 hours, seals fail in 1 hour, and seals fail in 2 hours. 
Core uncovery time - This is the time it takes to uncover the top of active fuel from a complete 
loss of core cooling and injection based on the maximum decay heat rate.  This value is nominally 
set to 0.5 hours. 
Battery depletion time - This is the time it takes to suffer a complete loss of DC power following 
a station blackout.  This time is based on the battery capacity, the expected DC power 
requirements, and the plant procedures for load shedding.  This information has been gathered from 
the station blackout rule responses and other plant information such as the plant specific PRA. 
Diesel repair time - This is the median time for restoration of one diesel generator when more than 
one is unavailable due to independent faults.  A median time of 4 hours is nominally used based on 
information in NUREG-1032. 
Short-term nonrecovery time, t-short - For initiating events that are recoverable (currently only 
small LOCAs and LOOPs are considered recoverable), recovery within this time would terminate 
the specific initiating event response.  The general transient response would then be appropriate.  A 
rigorous treatment of these recovered initiating events would transfer to the transient event tree; 
however, the sequence frequencies would be much smaller than the existing transient sequence 
frequencies and are ignored.  The short-term nonrecovery time is generally 0.5 hours. 
Non-LOOP initiating event non-recovery values - Transients and steam generator tube ruptures 
are considered nonrecoverable and are assigned a nonrecovery value of 1.0.  Small LOCAs are 
recoverable within time t-short.  The probability of not recovering within t-short for BWRs is 0.5 
and 0.43 for PWRs based on information provided in NUREG/CR 46743.  Modifying the 
“Recovery Event” data allows for the adjustment of nonrecovery probability parameters such as 
the equation type GEMDATA uses to calculate the recovery probabilities (Figure A-3). 
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Figure A-3.  LOOP nonrecovery screen in GEMDATA. 
Selecting the “Reports” menu option allows the user to produce reports for Plant, Class and 
Recovery data.  Reports can be produced on the screen, sent to a printer, or stored in text file 
format. 
The “Utility” menu option is used to load or save GEMDATA information in a text file format.  It 
also allows the user to “fix” a corrupted or damaged database using the “Rebuild” function. 
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APPENDIX B – LOOP-RELATED RECOVERIES 
The SPAR model loss of offsite power and station blackout event trees are constructed using 
typical fault tree linked to event tree models.  This section provides additional detail on the 
calculation of loss of offsite power initiating event frequency, offsite power recovery failure 
probability, and diesel generator recovery failure probability.  This information is applicable for 
SPAR models developed prior to 2005 (where they used five categories of LOOP): 
? Plant-centered.  A LOOP event in which the design and operational characteristics 
of the nuclear power plant itself play the major role in the cause and duration of 
the loss of offsite power.  The line of demarcation between plant-centered and 
switchyard-centered LOOP events is the nuclear power plant main and station 
transformers high-voltage terminals.  Both transformers are considered to be part 
of the switchyard. 
? Switchyard-centered.  A LOOP event in which the equipment, whether human-
induced or actual equipment failure, in the switchyard play the major role in the 
loss of offsite power. 
? Grid-related.  A LOOP event in which the initial failure occurs in the 
interconnected transmission grid that is outside the direct control of plant 
personnel. 
? Severe-weather-related. A LOOP event caused by severe weather, in which the 
weather is widespread, not just centered at the site, and capable of major 
disruption.  Severe weather is defined to be weather with forceful and non-
localized effects.  
? Extreme-weather-related.  A LOOP event caused by extreme weather, in which 
restoration of offsite power requires more than 24 hours.  Example, extreme 
hurricane that results in significant damage. 
The LOOP frequency and nonrecovery probability calculations that follow must be performed for 
each of the above LOOP subcategories separately, and must be performed for a composite 
representing all categories together.  
LOOP Frequencies  
In the SPAR models the LOOP initiating event frequency (?T) is the sum from all the individual 
LOOP frequency subclasses combined, or 
   5
T i
 i = 1
  =    .? ?? (1) 
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LOOP Nonrecovery Probabilities 
The SPAR model event trees include offsite power recovery failure events. The general expression 
used for calculating the probability of failing to recover offsite power is given by  
OPRF long short long short (    |   ) = P (   L >   |  L >   )t t t tP  (2) 
where L is the duration of a LOOP, and tlong is a sequence-dependent time requirement 
that is greater than tshort. The interpretation of tlong and tshort are model and sequence 
specific. The most common application is to station blackout sequences where tlong
corresponds to either battery depletion time or core uncovery time and tshort corresponds 
to a short-term recovery interval based on the time to uncover the reactor core if no safety 
systems function. In the current generation of SPAR models tshort is most often zero unless 
there are multiple failures to recover offsite power in a given sequence. In these sequences 
the first event calculation would use a tshort of zero and the remaining power recovery 
failure probabilities would be conditional on the previous failure event.  
The probability that offsite power will not be recovered at time t is the fraction of all LOOP events 
with duration L greater than t, or 
LL
t
P (  L > t ) =    (  l ) dl = 1 -  (  t )f F
?
?  (2) 
where fL is the density function for the distribution of observed LOOP durations, and FL is 
the cumulative distribution form of fL . Combining Equations 2 and 3 gives the general 
expression for offsite power recovery failure probabilities in the SPAR models 
long
short
L
t L long
OPRF long short
L short
L
t
  (  l ) dlf
1-  ( )tF (   |  ) = = t tP 1- ( )tF   (  l ) dl  f
?
?
?
?
 (3) 
Equation 3 can be modified so that recovery failure probabilities can be calculated when LOOP 
frequency and LOOP recovery information is divided into plant, switchyard, grid, and weather 
subclasses by frequency-weighting the class probabilities as follows: 
i
i
   n longL
iOPRF long short
T  i=1 shortL
tF1 (   |  )   =   t tP
tF
(1 - ( ))
(1 - ( ))
?
? ?  (4) 
B-5
Equation 4 is the most general form for calculating LOOP nonrecovery probabilities that is 
consistent with past and anticipated future LOOP modeling methods used in the SPAR models. 
Once the general form is known for the LOOP nonrecovery probability (Equation 4) and the 
frequency of each LOOP category is known, GEM still requires the functional form of the 
durations of LOOP for each category.  The SPAR models have used two different forms, Weibull 
and lognormal. 
The Weibull-based form of fL is 
- ( t  /    )
L
t  (  t ) =   f et
?
?
??
?
? ?
? ?
? ?
 (5) 
where 
? = the distribution shape parameter, and 
? = the distribution scale parameter. 
The lognormal-based form of fL is 
??
?
??
? ??
? ?
?
??
)ln(
2
1
2
1)(
t
e
t
tf  (6) 
where t = offsite power recovery time 
? = mean of natural logarithms of data 
? = standard deviation of natural logarithms of data 
? = error function. 
If the lognormal form of the LOOP duration is used, it is typical to rely on numerical methods to 
evaluate Equation 4.  However, if the Weibull form is used, Equation 4 may be solved analytically.  
Using Equation 4 and Equation 5 gives the following general expression for failure to recover 
offsite power at time tlong for LOOP class i, conditional on failure to recover offsite power at time 
tshort 
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i ilong i
long
i ishort i
i
short
L - (    /    )t
t
long shortOPRF - (    /    )t
L
t
  (  l ) dlf
e (   |  ) = = t tP
e   (  l ) dl  f
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
 (7) 
Equation 7 is presently applied when evaluating a specific class of LOOP, as in initiating event 
assessments where the class of initiating event is known. For the base case SPAR model a 
frequency-weighted average recovery failure probability is required and Equation 7 becomes 
i
long i
ishort i
-(   /    )t   5
iOPRF long short
-(    /    )tT  i=1
e1 (   |  )   =  t tP
e
?
?
?
?
?
? ?  (8) 
Diesel Nonrecovery Probabilities.  
The SPAR model event trees include various emergency power nonrecovery top events in the 
LOOP/SBO sequences. The emergency power nonrecovery values associated with these top events 
include recovery of an emergency diesel generator.  A median time for restoration of one diesel 
generator when more than one is unavailable due to independent faults is approximately four hours.  
In the SPAR models using the assumption of an exponential distribution of diesel recovery times, a 
median diesel generator repair time of four hours is used. This information can be used to construct 
a diesel generator recovery distribution density function  
D DGR- t
DD (  t ) =  f e ?? (9) 
where tDGR is the diesel generator repair time. Thus, the cumulative diesel generator recovery 
distribution is 
D DGR- t
D (  t ) = 1 - eF ?  (10) 
Solving for ?D associated with the median (50th percentile) gives 
ln
50 50
D
DGR DGR
-  (  0.5 ) 0.693 =  = 
t t
?  (11) 
where 
50DGRt is the median diesel generator repair time.  
 The probability that at least one diesel generator is not recovered for some duration G is 
D DGR50-  t -0.693 t /  tDD
t
P (  G > t ) =    (  g ) dg = 1 -  (  t ) =  = f e eF ?
?
?  (12) 
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The sequence-dependent repair failure probabilities used in the SPAR models are calculated from 
Equation 12.  Some SPAR models may assume that the DG restoration times are distributed via a 
Weibull distribution.  In these cases, the form of Equation 9 is modified to the Weibull distribution 
and evaluated via an equation similar to Equation 12. 
Current (2005 and newer) revisions of the SPAR models used a modified LOOP recovery 
approach.  For these SPAR models, GEM assumes the LOOP initiating event frequency (?T) is the 
sum from all the individual LOOP frequency subclasses combined, or 
?
?
?
4
1i
iT ?? (13) 
The four classes of LOOP initiating event identified are:  
? Plant-centered.  A LOOP event in which the design and operational characteristics of the 
nuclear power plant itself play the major role in the cause and duration of the loss of 
offsite power.  The line of demarcation between plant-centered and switchyard-centered 
LOOP events is the nuclear power plant main and station transformers high-voltage 
terminals.  Both transformers are considered to be part of the switchyard. 
? Switchyard-centered.  A LOOP event in which the equipment, whether human-induced or 
actual equipment failure, in the switchyard play the major role in the loss of offsite power. 
? Grid-related.  A LOOP event in which the initial failure occurs in the interconnected 
transmission grid that is outside the direct control of plant personnel. 
? Weather-related. A LOOP event caused by weather, in which the weather is widespread, 
not just centered at the site, and capable of major disruption.  Weather is defined to be 
weather with forceful and non-localized effects.  
The LOOP frequency and nonrecovery probability calculations must be performed for each of the 
above LOOP subcategories separately, and must be performed for a composite representing all 
categories together.  The LOOP plug-in in SAPHIRE must perform the calculation described by 
the equation above using specified parameters in such a way that both the correct point estimate 
and correct uncertainty distribution of ?T is obtained from the uncertainty distributions of the ?i.
Given the use of SAPHIRE basic events to represent the ?i, the uncertainty is obtained from the 
standard SAPHIRE sampling procedures. 
The current revisions of the SPAR model (2005 and newer) model the LOOP duration data using 
the assumption of lognormal applicable models (not Weibull).  Specifically, the formulation used is 
for the duration distribution is given by: 
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
? i
it
i
i et
tf ?
?
??
)ln(
2
1
2
1)(
for the probability density function or: 
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)( zttF
i
i
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?
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?
for the cumulative distribution function, 
where t = offsite power recovery time 
?i = mean of natural logarithms of data for i’th LOOP category 
?i = standard deviation for i’th LOOP category 
? = standard normal distribution function. 
Like for the LOOP nonrecovery calculation, SAPHIRE and GEM can also be used to determine 
diesel generator nonrecoveries.  In older versions of the SPAR models, the DG recovery was based 
upon the DG failure duration time being exponentially distributed.  The current SPAR models, and 
corresponding SAPHIRE calculation, assumes that the recovery time is Weibull distributed.  The 
Weibull-based form of fDG (the DG failure duration) is: 
??
?
?
? )/()( tDG e
t
t
tf ????
?
???
??
where 
? = the distribution shape parameter, and 
? = the distribution scale parameter. 
Note that if the ? parameter is assigned a value of one, then the distribution reverts to the 
exponential distribution used by earlier SPAR models. 
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